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6  Avenues and Obstacles 
to Growth 
In  late 1987 the government introduced a new  stabilization program that  was 
aimed at shoring up what was left of the 1985 Austral Plan. As shown in figure 
6.1, inflation in the post-stabilization period had passed from a comfortable 3-4 
percent per month to an uncomfortable 6-7  percent, before moving in October 
1987 into the exotic range: 20  percent  inflation for consumer prices  and 30 
percent  for wholesale prices.  As  were  previous  stabilizations, this  one  was 
doomed because it did not come to grips with fiscal necessities and the need to 
meet fundamental conditions for sustainable growth. 
The government’s dramatic loss in  the  congressional elections of  1987 
showed the strength of  the new  Argentine democracy, but  it  also left the 
government  critically  weakened.  The  hope  for  resumption  of  sustained 
growth, with moderate inflation, was yet one more step further away. In this 
chapter  we  investigate  which  policies  and  what  environment  would  be 
conducive to growth. Our conclusions, not surprisingly, are fundamentally 
pessimistic. The external environment continues to be unfavorable. The debt 
overhang requires large resource transfers abroad,  and  these transfers are 
made more difficult by very unfavorable terms of trade. 
The  domestic  economic  outlook  is  no  more  encouraging:  the  deficit 
continues to be too large, taxation remains inefficient, political and economic 
stability  are  lacking,  and,  as  a  result,  capital  formation  is  altogether 
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Fig. 6.1  Inflation since 1985 (CPI, percent per month) 116  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
inadequate. The hyperinflation of  1985 shocked Argentineans into accepting 
a policy directed toward national economic reconstruction. The tragedy today 
is that the steady decline of living standards and erosion of economic stability 
which Argentina has experienced for more than a decade continues unabated. 
Gradualism  may  not  offer  an  escape  from the  predicament.  Argentina  is 
learning slowly and painfully to introduce realism into public sector decisions 
within a democratic context,  an experience that is entirely new. 
6.1  Conditions for Economic Progress 
In  1929 Argentina  was  among the  seven richest  countries  in the  world. 
Today, the  living  standard has fallen  far below  that  in  advanced  countries 
and, unlike in most other countries,  is still declining.  The extent of decline 
revealed  by  estimates  of  official  GDP  may  overstate  the  actual  decline 
because  of  a  large  and  growing  underground  economy.  But  the  fact  of 
continuing and significant decline is unquestionable. 
The main requirements  for a resumption of sustainable growth are three- 
fold: 
increased  and sustained stability (institutional,  financial, and political); 
increased  investment,  both in the private and public sectors; and 
improved  resource  utilization  and  increased  efficiency  throughout  the 
economy. 
We  now  develop each of  these  requirements  in  more  detail.  But  it  is 
essential to point out at the beginning that their separation is artificial, since 
the  various  elements  are significantly  interdependent.  To  give an example, 
budget  problems  are  responsible  for  financial  instability,  and  financial 
instability is one of the explanations for low investment. But low investment 
also contributes to budget instability because it implies low growth. 
6.2  Investment, Saving, and Debt 
A  vast  literature  on growth,  in  advanced  and  in  developing  countries, 
supports the  idea  that  capital  accumulation  is one  of  the  most  important 
sources of growth. Capital accumulation  increases potential output directly, 
but it also tends to be a vehicle for technical progress.  Capital accumulation 
is important in both the private and public sectors. Public sector enterprises 
need to expand capacity not only with respect to infrastructure (for example, 
in telecommunications),  but also in more traditional industries which happen 
to be located in the public  sector. 
6.2.1  A Model 
We can consider a stylized model of  the growth process in an open econo- 
my in order to highlight the critical restrictions and tradeoffs.' We  start by 117  Argentidchapter 6 
fixing the target rate of output growth. Next we use the link between growth 
and  investment shown by the ICOR (incremental capital output ratio).  The 
ICOR gives us the net investment required (as a fraction of GDP) to support 
the target growth in output. In addition,  there is the investment required to 
offset capital depreciation.  The gross investment requirement (0) is: 
(1) 
where I and Y denote real gross investment and real GDP, respectively, y is the 
growth rate of output, and 6 is the fraction of GDP that needs to be invested 
to offset capital depreciation.  The ICOR is denoted by the coefficient a. 
Next  we  consider  the  financing  of  growth.  Net  external  liabilities  will 
increase  (as  a  fraction  of  GDP)  due to  debt  service  plus  the  noninterest 
current account deficit which is equal to  the ratio of  consumption and gross 
investment to GDP less unity: 
IIY  = 0 = ay + 6, 
(2)  b, = a b,-l  + (0 + c  -11, 
where b and c are the ratio of debt and consumption to GDP, and the term 
@  = (1 + r)/(l + y),  representing the ratio of  the interest factor (1  + r) 
to the growth factor (1 + y). 
Equation (2)  highlights an important point. Taking the investment require- 
ment as given, growth and an improving debt ratio may not be compatible. 
Specifically, suppose, as do Selowsky and van der Tak (1986), that the level 
of consumption grows more slowly than GDP so that the consumption ratio 
declines and the saving ratio increases over time. Thus even if the real interest 
rate  exceeds  the  growth  rate  so  that  @ > 1, the  rising  saving  ratio  can 
dominate and the debthcome ratio will eventually stabilize and then decline. 
Such is the force of compound interest that as the saving rate rises, it first 
is able to finance all of  the required investment and then interest payments, 
and  ultimately  an  ever-increasing  trade  surplus,  which  finances  debt 
amortization.  The interesting question concerns the time path of the saving 
rate, the current account, and the debVGDP ratio when a country embarks on 
an  investment  strategy  that  yields  sustained  growth.  Table  6.1  reports 
simulations of this model with parameters adapted to the case of Argentina. 
Table 6.1  Sustained Growth Scenarios 
Scenario A  Scenario B 
Year  S  FinancingGDP  DebVGDP  S  FinancingiGDP  DebVGDP 
1986  15.6  0.5  70.0  15.6  0.5  70.0 
1987  16.8  9.4  77.2  16.4  9.8  77.6 
1990  20.4  6.9  92.7  18.8  8.6  96.9 
1995  26.0  1.9  91.7  22.7  6.1  116.4 
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In the simulations,  the  initial debt/GDP  ratio is set at b  = 0.7, and the 
consumption ratio is c  = 0.844, as it was in  1986. The world real interest 
rate  is r  = 0.06. The simulations assume a target output growth rate of 3 
percent which implies a gross investment requirement of 22 percent. This is 
arrived at by  assuming  depreciation  of  13 percent and an ICOR  of  3.’  TO 
place  these  numbers  in  perspective,  we  note  that  growth  in  Argentina  in 
1979-80  averaged 2.3 percent,  while the ratio of  gross investment to  GDP 
averaged 21.8 percent. Thus a gross investment requirement of 22 percent is 
certainly not unrealistically high. 
We now explore the time path of the debt/GDP ratio under two alternative 
consumption scenarios: 
Scenario  A:  Per  capita  consumption  is  maintained  constant.  With 
population growth assumed to be  1.5 percent per year,  consumption thus 
grows at 1.5 percent while GDP grows at 3 percent. 
Scenario B: Per capita consumption grows at 0.5 percent per year. Even in 
this case, consumption growth falls short of the growth of GDP so that the 
saving rate rises over time. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the results of simulations under the two scenarios. 
The  column  labelled  s  shows  the  ratio  of  national  saving  to  GDP.  The 
financing/GDP ratio represents the current account deficit. 
Both  scenarios  show that  growth  is compatible  with  a reduction  in  the 
ratio of debt to income, but the reduction occurs only very far in the future, 
beyond the year 2000.3 What is the recipe for growth with debt reduction? 
The model highlights three critical elements: 
1. There is an increase in the investment  ratio which supports the  growth 
process.  The model  has  no room  for investment  plans,  so  the  critical 
question  of  why  firms  would  want  to  invest  goes  unanswered.  With 
respect to public  sector investment,  there is the unanswered question of 
financing the increase in budget deficits. 
2.  The increase in investment (without a compensating  increase in saving) 
initially  generates  an increase  in  the current  account deficit.  Borrowing 
finances  not  only  interest  payments  but  also  a  trade  deficit.  The 
availability of external finance to cover an increase in the trade deficit is 
thus a critical feature of the early stage of accelerated growth. This goes 
far beyond  the  “new  money”  in  present  concerted lending  programs 
which only covers part of the interest bill. 
3. The saving  rate  rises  throughout  and  reaches  Korean  levels  in  fifteen 
years. The increasing saving ratio assures that the current account deficit 
shrinks to zero and eventually  becomes  a surplus that helps  reduce the 
debt/GDP ratio.  Figure 6.2 shows the  simulation of the debt/GDP  ratio 
for the two scenarios. 119  ArgentindChapter 6 
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Fig. 6.2  The debt/GDP ratio: Alternative scenarios 
There is no doubt that such a development path is conceivable.  Korea, in 
fact, followed exactly this path.4 In the case of Argentina, however, there is 
considerable  skepticism regarding  each of  the three points. An  increase  in 
investment  is  unlikely  unless  a  much  more  stable  business  environment 
develops. But even if  private or public investment increased  spontaneously 
to start the growth process,  there is absolutely no reason to believe that the 
external financing required for growth would become available. But without 
external financing of the large trade deficits that come at the beginning of the 
growth process, growth cannot get underway. Thus the external constraint is 
binding  and  bars  growth  from the  outset.  Finally,  unless  the  saving  rate 
increases  over  time  and  eventually  exceeds  the  investment  rate,  the 
development  of  trade  surpluses  to  pay  interest  and  even  amortization  is 
impossible. 
If  external  financing is the constraint, the  model  suggests an alternative 
strategy: start off the growth process with an increase in the domestic saving 
rate,  i.e.,  with  a  reduction  in  per  capita  consumption.  The  increased 
availability  of  resources  now  finances  the required  increase  in  investment 
without causing the trade balance to deteriorate.  But this recipe brings into 
play  the  following  difficulty:  Can  the  cut  in  consumption  be  readily 
translated  into an external  surplus? This may  not be possible  if investment 
has  a  significant  import  content.  If  this  is  impossible,  there  will  be  a 
recession and a foreign exchange shortage. 
Suppose that  the  problem  of  resource  flexibility  does not  arise.  What 
might a growth program look like? If we assume that the initial reduction in 
the consumption  ratio  is sufficient  to finance  the increased  investment  and 
that  the  investment  requirement  is  22 percent,  or twice  the  1986 level, a 
reduction  in  the  consumption  ratio  by  10  percentage  points  or  some 120  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
reduction in the consumption ratio along with a suspension of debt service is 
required. Suspension of  debt service would imply that the noninterest current 
account  is  balanced  (1  =  c  +  O),  so  extra  resources  would  become 
available for investment.  In this case, the consumption ratio would  need  to 
fall by  only  6.4 percentage  points.  But, as a counterpart, the debtiincome 
ratio  would  be  rising.  The evolution  of  the  debt  ratio  over  time  would 
depend on how the consumption ratio behaves. 
We can distinguish two possibilities.  In one case, consumption and output 
grow at the same rate, so the consumption ratio is constant. The noninterest 
current account never improves and, as a result, the debt/GDP ratio steadily 
increases.  Effectively,  the  country  has  repudiated  its  debts  and  used  the 
flexibility  provided by abandoning  debt service, along with an initial cut in 
consumption, to embark on growth. The alternative  is, once again, a path 
where  consumption  grows less  rapidly  than  output. Hence the saving  rate 
increases  over time, the noninterest  surplus  improves, and, ultimately,  the 
debt/GDP ratio stabilizes and starts declining. Compared to the scenarios in 
table  6.1, the  strategy  of  an  initial  reduction  in  consumption involves  a 
smaller financing requirement and hence, throughout, a lower ratio of debt to 
GDP. 
6.2.2  Creditors’ Preferences 
We have looked so far at alternative growth strategies defined in terms of a 
desirable path of  consumption. Another perspective  is that of the creditors, 
who are concerned with creditworthiness as measured by the debt/GDP ratio 
and naturally want to minimize  new money commitments. 
Creditors would certainly think that home-financed growth is an excellent 
idea, but they would  also believe that the increase  in the debtiincome ratio 
should  be kept to a minimum. Table 6.2 shows the recent  debt facts. The 
rising  debt/GDP  ratio  and  the  rising  level  of  debt  would  certainly  lead 
creditors to emphasize adjustment paths with debt reduction. 
Creditors might, for example, recommend a focus on the debt ratio rather 
than  on  the  growth  of  that  ratio.  According  to  their  type  of  plan,  the 
consumption  ratio would be allowed to increase only if  the debt/GDP ratio 
Table 6.2  The External Debt (in billions of $US.  and as a percentage of GDP) 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Total external debt  35.8  43.6  45.1  46.6  48. I  51.7 
Debt of the public sector (%)  55.8  65.6  70.3  77.0  85.2  85.5 
Debt to official creditors (%)  7.9  6.4  15.5  11.2  16.8  20.5 
DebVGDP ratio  63.1  75.9  73.5  71.1  74.4  73.7 
InterestiGDP ratio  6.8  8.6  8.8  8.5  7.9  6.6 
Resource gap (% of  GDP)  I .5  -3.4  -4.4  -5.0  -6.8  -2.6 
InvestmenVGDP ratio  19.5  16.4  14.2  12.4  10.6  11.9 
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fell  below  the  target level. In this  scenario, much  of the growth translates 
immediately into trade surpluses and thus would serve debt reduction. 
Such an adjustment process is clearly implicit in the IMF Staff Report of 
July 1987 on Argentina. This report envisages a reduction in the ratio of debt 
to GDP from 70 to 55 percent during  1987-92.  The current account deficit 
is expected to fall from 3.5 percent of GDP in 1986 to just above 1 percent 
by  1992. Essential to this outlook, as always, is the assumption that budget 
balancing  provides  the  increase  in  saving  and  that  an  investment  and  an 
export boom are the engines of growth. 
A more plausible route is suggested by table 6.3. Argentina in  1984-86 
was running large trade surpluses that were sufficient to pay up to half of its 
interest liabilities. This suggests the possibility  of abandoning the policy  of 
resource  transfers,  with the  increase  in investment  financed  by  suspending 
the trade surpluses rather than by an initial increase in saving. 
6.2.3  Debt Service Alternatives 
There  are  two  different  ways  in  which  a  suspension  of  the  resource 
transfer  might work. One is  an outright repudiation  or  suspension of  debt 
service. The alternative is a moratorium or debt write-down such as has been 
urged  by  Rodriguez  (1986a,  1986b,  1986c), among  others.  In  this case, 
resources  in  the  budget  that  can  be  used  for home  investment  become 
available. The suspension of payments  abroad dispenses with the need for a 
large trade surplus and hence provides the resources from the supply side to 
step up growth. 
A more attractive opportunity seeks a compromise between the interests of 
creditors and the requirement that resources be available for investment and 
growth.  Such  a program  might  take  the  following  form. The government 
engages  in  a  comprehensive  fiscal  reform  that  entails  an  improvement  in 
public  sector spending programs,  a major tax  reform  to generate revenue, 
and a restructuring of the external debt service process. The domestic effort 
centers on eliminating the budget deficit and raising national saving. External 
creditors  would  receive  half  the  interest payments  in  Australs,  having  the 
right  to  use  them  to  make  any  investment  in  the  economy,  with  the  sole 
restriction that the resources cannot be repatriated. The remaining half of the 
interest  payments  would  be  suspended  pending  reconstruction  of  the 
economy. 
Table 6.3  Investment and Resource Transfers (as a percentage of GDP) 
Noninterest Current 
Period  Investment  Account Surplus 
1970-81  21.2 
1982-86  11.9 
1.6 
4.7 
Source: World Bank 122  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
The part of  the debt under suspension would accumulate real interest at a 
rate equal to the growth rate of  per capita real  income,  i.e., per capita real 
GDP growth adjusted for changes in the terms of  trade.  Thus external debt 
service  is,  in  part,  recycled  into  the  economy,  suspending  the  external 
transfer  problem.  The  rest  is  suspended  to  free  budget  resources  for 
investment and to dispense with inflationary finance. If the program succeeds 
in  reconstructing  the  economy,  creditors  fully  benefit  from  the  increased 
ability  to  pay.  Creditors  have  an  interest  in  such a  program  because  the 
current  arrangement  offers  a  lesser  chance  of  ever recovering  the  credits. 
The reason  is that the current process  of  debt collection  destroys  financial 
stability and bars investment.  As a result, there is no mechanism to enhance 
the ability (hence, willingness) to pay. 
A  focus on the transfer problem helps in understanding  the links among 
the budget,  debt service, inflation, and the lack of investment.  A domestic 
budget effort is, of  course, indispensable.  Much of the inflation problem is 
one of  fiscal laxity and the inefficiency of government.  The budget problem 
is not exclusively a reflection of  the external debt. But a restructuring of the 
external  debt  can  and  certainly  should  be  part  of  a reconstruction  effort. 
Reconstruction has three features. First, there is a need for real resources for 
investment.  These become available by  budget correction and by recycling 
external interest payments into the economy.  Second, there is a need to stop 
inflationary  finance.  The  suspension  of  trade  surpluses  helps  because  it 
means a reduction in the real exchange rate and hence relief  in the budget. 
Most  of  the  correction,  though,  must  come from an  improvement  in  the 
budget  such that foreign creditors  are paid  with  the revenue  from outright 
taxation  (or increased public  sector efficiency  and  expenditure  cuts) rather 
than  with  the revenue  from  the  inflation  tax.  Third, the  credibility of  the 
program  is  enhanced  by  a  formula  for  capitalization  of  external  interest 
geared  to  an  ability  to  pay  rather  than  to  an  exogenous  and  possibly 
excessively high world real interest rate. 
We  conclude  this  section by  summarizing  the  main  message:  there  is  a 
tight  link  between  growth  and  external  debt service.  Unless  the  domestic 
saving rate can be raised, more debt service means less growth. As we shall 
see presently,  more  debt  service  also  means  less  financial,  economic, and 
political  stability. 
6.3  Efficiency of  Resource Allocation 
Increased efficiency  in resource allocation is an important complement to 
higher rates of  investment in raising the sustainable growth of output. More 
efficient resource utilization simply means that a given factor input produces 
a  higher  level  of  output.  In  Argentina  the  experience  with  productivity 
growth is exceptionally poor. This is brought out in table 6.4, which shows 123  ArgentindChapter 6 
Table 6.4  Sources of Growth (average annual percentage rate) 
Period  GDP  Capital  Labor  Residual 
___~ 
1960-65  4.6  3.5  1.6  2.0 
1965-70  3.5  4.3  3.5  -0.8 
1970-75  3.8  4.5  3.6  -0.2 
1975-80  1.8  4.  I  I .8  -1.0 
1980-86  -0.3  1.1  1.6  -3.1 
- 
Note:  The  estimates for  1960-80  come  from  Elias  (1982),  where  capital  and  labor growth are  quality 
adjusted. The 1980-86  data are reported  in  McCarthy (1987).  The residual  is  obtained  by  weighting  the 
factor inputs by their distributive  shares. McCarthy assumes a labor share of 47 percent. 
estimates of the sources of growth in real GDP for the past twenty-five years. 
The  striking  fact  in  this  table  is  the  extraordinarily  low  contribution  of 
growth to total factor productivity. 
By  comparison, Korea,  certainly one  of  the  strong  performers  among 
developing countries, achieved an average GDP growth rate of 8.2 percent in 
1963-83.  Of  that  growth, nearly  half  was  due to growth  in  total  factor 
prod~ctivity.~  Only  in  the early  1960s did  Argentina  come  close  to  that 
performance.  What  reasons  for  this  poor  performance  on  the  productivity 
front can be given? 
One reason  for poor productivity  growth  is the  inefficient  trade regime, 
which leads to a continuing high level of protection and to variability in key 
relative  prices.  A  more  trade-oriented  development  strategy  would  draw 
resources  into  more  efficient  uses.  Sturzenegger  (1986)  has  studied  the 
antitrade  bias  of  protection  and  the  implicit  import tax.  Table 6.5 reports 
various measures of  distortions  in relative prices. 
The  table  brings  out  the  strong  bias  against  trade  implicit  in  the 
protectionist structure: the domestic relative price of exportables in terms of 
importables is about one-half the world price ratio. There is thus a powerful 
incentive  operating  against  exporting and  in  favor  of  import  substitution, 
which  in  itself  represents  highly  inefficient  resource  allocation.  The 
inefficiency  is, of course, compounded  by  the limited scale of the market, 
Table 6.5  Antitrade Bias and Implicit Import Tax, 1%0-84 
1960-69  1970-79  1980-84 
Export taxa  11.9  14.1  10.0 
Anti-export biasb  48.2  56.9  44.4 
Implicit import taxC  63.7  51.5  96.6 
Source:  Sturzenegger (1986) 
"Export tax revenue as a fraction of  exports. 
bRatio of  domestic to external terms of  trade 
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which prevents important scale economies and limits competitive pressures 
on  pricing.  The inward-looking  production  structure and  lack  of  compe- 
tition  likewise  stand  in  the  way  of  exposure  to  and  adoption  of  foreign 
technology. 
The  systematic  antitrade  bias  is  only  one  of  the  respects  in  which 
resources are inefficiently utilized. The high variability of relative prices is 
another example. Between  1976 and  1980 the average tariff rate on imports 
declined from 55 percent to only 22 percent.  By  1982 it had increased to 27 
percent,  and  in  December  1985  it  stood  at  37  percent.  Half  the  tariff 
positions  had duties  in  excess of  30  percent.  In  1982 licensing  applied  to 
only  13.5 percent  of  imports.  By  1985 it  reached  46.6 percent  of  all the 
tariff positions.6 
Another example of  variability  in policies is the extreme variation in the 
real  exchange  rate  documented  in  earlier chapters.  For  instance,  the  real 
exchange rate for “traditional”  (agro-based) manufactured exports declined 
from an index level of 100 in  1976 to 54 by  1980, and was back up to 99 by 
1983; for “nontraditional”  manufactured exports the real exchange rate fell 
to 50 in 1980 and returned to 87 by  1983. 
The same variability can be found in real interest rates. Figure 6.3  shows 
the monthly real interest rate for the past eight years. Episodes with extremely 
high real rates, such as in 1980-81  and in 1985-86, alternate with periods of 
extremely low real rates, as in mid-1982. In other periods real rates are simply 
variable, fluctuating between positive and negative, as in  1984-85.  Such a 
situation  inevitably  leads  to  short horizons  and  speculation  on  near-term 
relative prices rather than to long-run efficient use of resources. 
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A discussion of  efficiency  in resource utilization  cannot avoid mention of 
the  public  sector,  where  resources  are  being  used  in  a  highly  inefficient 
manner.  In part this  is the result  of  militant  unions,  in  part  the legacy of 
military  patronage,  and  in  part it  is  endemic  to public  sector enterprises. 
Whatever the primary  explanation for the current state of affairs, Argentina 
has much to gain from a trimmer and more efficient public sector. 
6.4  Budget Deficits and Financial Instability 
The third problem area is stability of institutions and policies. The lack of 
stability  can be  measured  by  any number of  variables:  the wide  swings in 
economic  philosophy  of  those  in  power,  ranging  from  Peronism  to 
Alsogoray; the short average tenure of  finance ministers; and the variability 
in  the  level  of  output  (as  shown  in  figure  6.4,  for  example)  for  the 
manufacturing sector. However, the most immediate indicator of  underlying 
instability  is  the  inflation  rate.  During  the  past  twenty  years,  Argentine 
inflation has always been high, and most of the time a sharp acceleration is 
just  around the comer.  As a result,  economic  actors are always concerned 
with the possibility  of  inflation and with the shift in politics and economic 
policies that will occur when inflation gets out of hand. In practice, inflation 
uncertainty means short horizons for production decisions and a concentra- 
tion on liquidity  and  inflation hedging.  The economic  structure that results 
emphasizes finance at the expense of production. 
The inflation problem is, of course, a direct outgrowth of persistent budget 
deficits.  The budget  deficit  today  is  substantially  financed  (except for the 
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new  money  portion  coming  from  foreign  creditors)  by  printing  money. 
Occasionally,  deficits are financed  by  domestic debt, now  denominated  in 
dollars. But the  very  high  interest  rates-well  above 20 percent  on dollar 
bonds in late  1987-discourage  this channel of financing. Thus the inflation 
tax,  rather  than  ordinary  taxes,  finances  the  government’s outlays.  This 
raises two questions. First, why is it so difficult to shift from an inflation tax 
to  ordinary  taxation?  After  all,  the  inflation  tax  is  highly  regressive,  so 
changing the tax structure should be politically attractive. Second, why is it 
so difficult to contain government outlays? 
Table  5.3 above has already  shown the  budget  deficit  calculated  using 
IMF/BCRA measures.  Other measures, such as those prepared by FIEL, are 
more comprehensive and show even larger deficits.  We  have already  noted 
the  existence of  a  wide  range of  deficit  measures and  the  fact that  public 
discussion has not settled on any particular measurement. The difficulties are 
chiefly  coverage (central  government, all  levels  of  government, etc.),  the 
inclusion  of  particular  accounts  (treatment  of  public  sector  enterprise 
investment,  Central  Bank  losses,  Central  Bank  discounts),  and  the 
distinction  between  budget  and  cash  bases.  Even  so,  various  sources  do 
portray  roughly  equivalent fluctuations  in  the  budget,  and  hence  we  can 
focus  on  any  one  measure  to  make  the  point  that  there  are  large  and 
persistent  deficits.  These deficits  require financing,  and  that  financing,  as 
other sources have  now  dried up,  increasingly  takes  the form of  printing 
money. 
We  concentrate here  on two central  points  in  the  budget  situation:  the 
appalling  record  on enforcement of  tax  collection, and the outlays in  the 
budget that result from financial instability or policy mistakes. 
Tax  fraud  is  so  common  in  Argentina  that  it  is  almost  considered  a 
citizen’s right.  Income  tax  collection  in  1985  accounted  for  less  than  1 
percent of GDP! Some idea of the extraordinary  degree of  evasion is given 
by a report of  the Ministry  of  the Economy: in a country of  more than 30 
million  inhabitants,  only one and a half  million  were  registered  taxpayers. 
Of those registered, less than one-third filed a return and less than  1 percent 
of  those registered declared any tax liabilities due. Worse, 84 percent of the 
total revenue  from income and value-added  taxes  was paid by 6 percent of 
the  registered  taxpayers. Thus one must  ask  why  those 29,081  Argentine 
households and firms do pay when nobody else does.’ 
In  1985-86  the  government  made  considerable progress  in  collecting 
taxes.  Unfortunately,  most  of  the  additional  tax  collection  was  of  an 
emergency variety.  There were new taxes on imports and exports, increases 
in real public utility rates, and increased taxation of those who had already 
paid. The role of  public  utility  rates  as a source of  revenue is particularly 
problematic. The political  and inflationary effect of changes in utility  rates 
makes them  targets  for politicization.  As a consequence, rates  tend to fall 
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finance.  When the time comes to restore  the  budget  and the  real  value  of 
utility  rates, this  results  in  a  major  inflationary  shock. Essential  in  public 
finance is to index rates once and for all, and to put rate decisions at arm’s 
length from the budget and political  process. 
Establishment  and  enforcement  of  a broad-based,  efficient  tax  system is 
the most urgent task. With a broad-based tax system applying low rates to a 
large body of taxpayers, the extreme inequity and inefficiency of the present 
system can be reduced.  At the same time, there would be significant  room 
for collecting more tax revenue without adverse supply-side effects. 
With  regard  to  outlays,  we  want  to emphasize two  categories  directly 
related  to past policy mistakes.  One is the large external interest bill which 
reflects in part the fact that the government increasingly  “nationalized”  the 
external  debt  from  1981 on. This occurred  partly  as  a means  of  stopping 
capital  outflows  when  the  government  took  over from the  private  sector 
external loans that had not yet matured but which private borrowers wanted 
to pay off in anticipation of depreciation.  In part the debt was nationalized in 
the course of financial market problems. By now more than 85 percent of the 
external debt is a burden on the budget,  but there is no significant offset in 
terms of  revenues.  As a result of  this  debt nationalization,  there  are extra 
outlays  amounting  to  5-6  percent  of  GDP  which  the  government  must 
finance. 
Moreover,  every time  the real  exchange rate  is depreciated,  the ratio of 
debt service to GDP increases and so does the budget deficit. A  15 percent 
real  depreciation,  for  example,  raises  the  budget  deficit  by  1  percent  of 
GDP.* Thus, once more, external debt and adjustments to ensure continued 
debt  service  play  an  important part  in  keeping  macroeconomic  instability 
alive. 
The other element in the budget that is directly due to past policy mistakes 
appears in the quasi-fiscal  deficit. Specifically, in 1981-84  in the aftermath 
of  the  Martinez  de  Hoz  overvaluation,  the  government  had  to  pay  out 
extraordinary sums as the result of  exchange rate guarantees. On average,  10 
percent of GDP was paid out in those years to cover bets lost by the public 
sector! Needless to say, financing of these losses is an important element in 
the buildup of inflation after 1982. 
The correction of  budget deficits is essential because the current situation 
has  two  clear implications.  First,  high  and  rising  inflation  is  always just 
around the comer. That possibility discourages any long-term investment and 
assures the  public  that  holding  assets  abroad  remains  the  best  investment. 
The resulting  speculation against the currency puts pressure on the exchange 
rate,  forcing  the  monetary  authorities  to produce  high  real  interest  rates. 
The  high  real  rates  in  turn  discourage  productive  investment,  aggravate 
bankruptcy  problems,  and  worsen  the  budget  by  their  adverse  effects  on 
activity. When the unreasonable  fiscal position is routinely  compensated for 
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is  required:  tight  fiscal  policy  to raise  saving,  and  easy  money  to  finance 
domestic investment and reduce the risk of  business bankruptcies. 
6.5  External Constraints to Growth 
Most of Argentina’s economic problems are homemade, but not all. The 
external  environment  has been  exceptionally  unfavorable  in  recent  years. 
These poor external conditions have reduced the flexibility for policymakers, 
making adjustment more inflationary. 
The  U.S. policy  mix  of  1981-85,  with  record  real  interest  rates,  a 
massive dollar appreciation,  and a sharp decline in commodity prices,  was 
an  important  part  of  the  Argentine  debt  crisis.  The  magnitude  and 
persistence of these very poor policies were especially damaging to countries 
such  as  Argentina,  where  debts  are  in  dollars  and  mostly  geared  to 
short-term  market  rates  and  where  there  is  a  significant  concentration  on 
commodities on the export side. Without this external shock, there certainly 
would have been a debt crisis, but the increase in indebtedness would have 
been far less, as we already saw in chapter 3. 
The outstanding feature of the poor external environment  was, of course, 
the credit rationing and the short-leash  approach that was introduced  in the 
aftermath  of  the  Mexican  debt  crisis  of  1982.  The  concerted-lending 
approach  not  only  proved  cumbersome,  but  it  also focused  attention  on 
financial  aspects  at the  expense  of  long-run  growth  considerations.  Debt 
negotiations  kept  policymakers  in  a  perpetual  state  of  emergency.  IMF 
conditionality,  oriented  to  quarterly  targets,  distracted  all  attention  away 
from long-run  policy  reform  toward  balance  sheet  tricks  and  emergency 
taxation. 
The environment has been unfavorable in other respects, too. The terms of 
trade have deteriorated sharply since the early  1980s. As a result, there has 
been a need for more depreciation of the currency, which in turn has meant a 
worsening of the budget,  more inflation, and a reduced standard of  living. 
The terms of trade deterioration shown in table 6.6 and figure 6.5 reflects 
in part the decline in world agricultural prices, especially for those products 
of  interest  to Argentina.  Wheat prices in dollars today, for example, are 30 
percent  below  their  1981-85  levels, and the  same is true for an  index of 
food products in world trade. The dramatic decline in the real price of food 
Table 6.6  Terms of Trade (index 1970 = 100) 
1970-74  119  1985  95 
1975-79  94  1986  81 
1980-84  112  1987  78 
1984  110 
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Fig. 6.5  The terms of trade: 1970-87  (Index 1970 =  100) 
reflects the rapid growth in agricultural productivity and the increasing self- 
sufficiency  of  traditional  importing  countries.  But  it  also  reflects  the 
agricultural  support  policies  of  industrial  countries.  The  policies  of  the 
European  Common Market,  in  particular,  are  costly  for Argentina.  As  a 
case  in  point,  when  Spain  joined  the  common  market,  the  diversion  of 
trade caused Argentina to lose a traditional buyer of Argentine wheat.  The 
U.S. drought of  1988 gave  a reprieve  by  sharply raising export prices  for 
Argentine  agricultural  products.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
policymakers  can  appropriate  some  of  this  windfall  for budget  correction 
rather than  dissipate  it  in further macroeconomic  instability and premature 
debt service. 
For  manufactured  exports,  the  news  is  no  better.  Although  the  world 
economy  grew  at  a  significant  pace  over the  past  five  years, competition 
among newly industrialized countries has been intense.  Morever, protection 
in the industrialized countries’ markets has been increasing.  The growth of 
protection,  in turn,  has  served  to  discourage  investment  in  nontraditional 
exports. 
6.6  Concluding Remarks 
In July  1986 Brazil and Argentina signed agreements to initiate a limited 
free trade regime. This is the only bright spot on the external side, but it is 
also an event with the potential to overshadow even the debt problem in its 
scope and promise. 
For the time being, the agreement covers only specific sectors. But there is 
no question that if it is expanded to unrestricted free trade, the implications 130  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
for Argentina would be dramatically positive.  The size of the market would 
increase fivefold.’  Firms could specialize in products for which they have the 
greatest comparative advantage, and thus reap major  scale economies. The 
increase in competition  in the home market would  give consumers a major 
increase  in  real  income.  Free  trade  with  Brazil  (unlike  unilateral  trade 
liberalization)  offers a  plausible  strategy  for  reaping  massive  gains  from 
trade  without  the  immediate risk  of  a  serious  destruction  of  industry.  An 
opening to Brazil might be one of  the very few means available to Argentina 
for reversing the steadily declining  standard of  living. 
We  have  argued  in  this  chapter  that  poor  economic  performance  in 
Argentina  is  the  result  of  a  number  of  interdependent  factors:  debt, 
inefficiency,  poor  public  finance,  and  an  adverse  external  environment. 
There is little scope for bootstrapping  the country out of  this predicament. 
Even  a  moratorium  is  unlikely  to set off  a  process  of  sustained  growth. 
The  hyperinflation  woke  up  the  national  conscience  and  gave  the 
government a  brief  moment  in  which  to  achieve  some consolidation. But 
the  change  in  policies  and  opportunities  was  not  sufficiently  large  and 
durable to reverse  the drift  back into poor performance.  The Austral  Plan 
of  1985 gave a powerful  boost to  confidence  in economic management, as 
shown  in  figure 6.6. The gain  in approval  after stabilization  in  May  1985 
exceeds  30  percent!  But  since  then,  public  approval  of  economic 
management  has declined below  the prestabilization  levels. Thus, political 
support for change has been dissipated. 
It is clear today that a turnaround in public finance, financial stability, and 
investment simply will not happen except as a byproduct of an extraordinary 
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Fig. 6.6  Public opinion poll rating approval of economic management 
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leaves the free trade option with Brazil as one of the few cards policymakers 
have left to play. A major fiscal reform, widening the tax base and achieving 
public sector efficiency, restructuring of the external debt service, and a new 
initiative in  trade  policies  form a program  that  can reconstruct  Argentina. 
Such a program now requires urgent attention. 
In  concluding  we  draw  on  Carlos  Diaz  Alejandro’s  (1988)  words  to 
balance the widespread skepticism about Argentina’s economic future: 
Paradoxically,  the  troubles  of  the  1970s in  Argentina  may  have  set the 
bases  for  political  conditions  allowing  steadier  and  more  efficient 
economic  policies.  . . . Perhaps  swords  and  furnaces  will  be  put  away, 
and  quieter  hours  may  come.  Under  conditions  of  reasonable  political 
stability,  the  unsinkable  Argentine  economy  could  recover  from  the 
catastrophes  of  the  late  1970s  and  the  early  1980s,  including  a  high 
external  debt  for which  so little  growth  can be  shown.  Abundant  food 
stuffs  and  energy  resources,  plus  an  industry  which,  whatever  its  past 
costs, has  shown  itself  capable  of  exporting, provide  solid  foundations 
for a growth which may or may not keep up with those of  Australia and 
Brazil, but which assure a good life to all Argentines. 
Appendixes 
Appendix A 
Price Dynamics Under a Tablita Regime 
In this appendix, we sketch a model of  inflation dynamics under a Martinez 
de Hoz-style  program.  The essential  linkages  are purchasing  power parity 
for traded goods and integration of the capital market.  The former implies 
that prices of  traded goods are determined by the exchange rate: 
(A. 1)  P, = e 
and that interest rates are set by the world market with an adjustment for the 
rate of  depreciation: 
(A.2)  i=i*+A 
where  i*  is the international interest rate and A  is the rate of  depreciation. 
The real  exchange  rate  is  defined  as  R  = P,/e,  which  is  the  ratio  of 
home  goods to  traded  goods prices.  Let n denote  the  rate  of  inflation  of 
home goods prices and  A  the rate of traded goods price inflation. From the 